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Michael C. Rea, World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002) 
 
Michael Rea’s book aims to weaken the grip that he thinks naturalism has on the 
philosophical profession.  In pursuit of this aim, he argues for a series of theses that may 
strike some readers as incredible: that naturalism must be viewed as a “research program” 
(p. 73), rather than as a substantive philosophical thesis; that naturalism “cannot be 
adopted on the basis of evidence” (pp. 6-7); that naturalists cannot be justified in 
accepting either realism about material objects, or realism about other minds, or 
materialism (p. 8), these commitments constituting a powerful pragmatic case against 
being a naturalist; that these commitments can be avoided through the adoption of a 
supernaturalist research program that “legitimates belief in some sort of supernatural 
being” (pp. 213-14); that “except in the case of objects that are the products of design, 
proper functions are not empirically detectable” (p. 111); and that Plantinga’s 
evolutionary argument against naturalism not merely succeeds, but can also be extended 
to tell against intuitionism (pp. 182-99). 
 
 But don’t be deterred.  The book is engaging, sophisticated, resourceful, and 
good-natured.  I recommend it highly as a challenging and provocative discussion of 
some of the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological issues that draw people into 
philosophy in the first place.  Its arguments would have benefited from a more rigorous 
presentation; but pages full of numbered propositions are uninviting, and perhaps Rea 
made the right call in preferring informality.  I shall discuss Rea’s case for three of his 
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theses: that naturalism must be viewed as a “research program”; that naturalism “cannot 
be adopted on the basis of evidence”; and that naturalists cannot be justified in accepting 
realism about material objects. 
 
Rea construes naturalism, not as a thesis, but as “a research program” (p. 73), 
where, by “research program”, he means, roughly, a particular set of methodological 
dispositions, i.e., dispositions to “trust certain ways of acquiring information with respect 
to various topics and to distrust others” (p. 2).  Specifically, he construes a naturalist as 
someone whose methodological dispositions amount to treating “the methods of science 
and those alone as basic sources of evidence” (p. 67).  And he does so because it is the 
most charitable way to specify the heart and soul of naturalism given that, as he argues in 
Chapter 3, “naturalism…cannot be formulated as a substantive philosophical thesis” (p. 
52). 
 
 Two comments.  First, Rea’s claim that naturalism cannot be formulated as a 
philosophical thesis is less shocking than initially appears.  If you want to endorse one of 
the many theses sometimes called “naturalism” (e.g., that all events are governed by 
impersonal laws, that every empirical phenomenon is, or supervenes upon, some 
phenomenon treated in some branch of science, or that there is no way of certifying the 
methods of science prior to employing those methods), then nothing in Rea’s Chapter 3 
even purports to show that you cannot coherently do so.  What it does aim to show is that 
you cannot properly treat any of these claims as an articulation of naturalism. 
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 Why not?  Rea’s answer is that to treat any of these claims as articulating a thesis 
of naturalism would conflict with the intuitive core of naturalism, which is attitudinal: 
“Naturalism is motivated by a high regard for scientific method”, says Rea (p. 52); and 
“naturalists respect the natural sciences as absolutely authoritative with respect to what 
there is (p. 55)”.  But—and here is my second comment—the resulting argument for 
construing naturalism as a set of methodological dispositions isn’t entirely convincing.  
For one thing, it appears to beg the question.  Rea argues that naturalism must be a set of 
methodological dispositions because it cannot be a thesis, and he argues it cannot be a 
thesis because being a naturalist is (at least) the having of a high regard for scientific 
method.  But a high regard for scientific method sounds like a set of methodological 
dispositions.  Apparently, then, Rea rejects the construal of naturalism as a thesis from 
the very beginning. 
  
Another trouble is that it is doubtful that “naturalism” even names a single thing 
with a heart and soul to be characterized in the first place.  Admittedly, we should 
probably presume that any term in ordinary language is univocal, absent evidence to the 
contrary; but I doubt such a presumption is legitimate for terms in contemporary 
philosophical discourse, where stipulative redefinition of pre-existing terms is so 
common.  And even if a presumption of univocality holds also for philosophical 
terminology, it could only be very weak; and the conspicuous lack of agreement on the 
definition of “naturalism”, which Rea himself emphasizes, provides evidence that in this 
case the presumption is false. 
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 Rea holds, strikingly, that “there is no basis for saying that [naturalism] is the sort 
of program that everybody…ought to adopt (p. 7).”  And he does so because he claims 
that research programs in general, whether naturalist or not, “cannot be adopted on the 
basis of evidence” (p. 6-7).  Now this last claim is striking because it suggests that Rea 
will defend a sophisticated version of the popular notion that a commitment to science is 
really just a secular faith, no better off epistemically than any standard religion.  So what 
does Rea say to support it?  The gist emerges clearly enough from the following remarks: 
 
…the reason why research programs cannot be adopted on the basis of evidence is 
that evidence can only be recognized as such from within a research 
program…We cannot say that [a research program] is supported by evidence that 
is somehow generated and recognizable as such independently of the program. (6) 
 
 Since a research program is the totality of one’s methodological dispositions, Rea 
clearly has a point: we could not justify all of our methodological dispositions 
simultaneously, since doing so without circularity would require activating some 
methodological disposition that we were not trying to justify, and by assumption there is 
no such disposition.  But this is just the familiar point—often stressed by naturalists—that 
one cannot simultaneously replace all the planks of Neurath’s raft.  Rea, however, infers 
a distinctive conclusion from this familiar point: 
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So when it comes to rejecting one program in favor of another, the decision to 
adopt the favored program must be made on pragmatic grounds, broadly 
speaking, rather than evidential grounds. (6) 
 
But this striking conclusion does not seem to follow, for even though we cannot justify a 
whole research program, we might still be able to argue that one research program should 
(evidentially) be favored over another. 
 
 Rea’s conclusion recalls Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis that no dispute 
between rival paradigms can ever be resolved rationally because integral to each 
paradigm is a unique set of standards for evaluating hypotheses, while no supra-
paradigmatic standards exist to which paradigm-independent appeal might be made.  
Now the best response to Kuhn’s thesis is that although rival paradigms might not 
incorporate exactly the same standards for evaluating hypotheses, there might well be, 
and usually will be, sufficient standards common to both paradigms to make possible an 
argument for one paradigm over the other that is acceptable to advocates of both 
paradigms.  Likewise, I suggest, in the case of rival research programs in Rea’s sense.  
Allow that two research programs do not incorporate exactly the same methodological 
dispositions, and that there is no methodological vantage point independent of a research 
program; but insist that two distinct research programs might share sufficiently many 
methodological dispositions for advocates of both programs to reach rational consensus 
about those methodological dispositions that are not shared.  Such a possibility shows 
that the decision to reject one research program in favor of another need not be made on 
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merely pragmatic grounds, despite the absence of an Archimedean point from which to 
justify research programs. 
 
 Let me illustrate with a pertinent example.  The naturalist’s methodological 
dispositions are precisely those characteristic of science; by contrast, the 
supernaturalist’s methodological dispositions might include those of science plus a 
disposition to treat religious experience as a basic source of evidence (p. 68).  
Accordingly, the naturalist and the supernaturalist share many methodological 
dispositions.  Appeal to these shared dispositions could rationally lead one or the other to 
modify his research program.  One such shared disposition might be (i) to treat the 
overall coherence of one’s theoretical and methodological positions as required for their 
truth and (ii) to respond to the discovery of incoherence by making the most conservative 
modification possible that still removes it.  Moreover, there might be ways to evaluate the 
coherence of supernaturalism, with its treatment of religious experience as a basic source 
of evidence, that supernaturalists could employ: the deliverances of religious experience 
could be scrutinized for internal coherence, i.e., coherence with one another; the 
deliverances of religious experience could be scrutinized for external coherence, i.e., 
coherence with the deliverances of other sources of evidence accepted as such by 
naturalists and supernaturalists alike; and religious experience could be assessed for the 
likelihood of our discovering a plausible account of its origins and reliability.  Now if the 
treatment of religious experience as a basic source of evidence turned out to generate 
incoherence in supernaturalism, then the most conservative way to remove the 
incoherence would surely be to retreat to naturalism.   Thus, given one of their own 
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methodological dispositions, supernaturalists could have epistemic reason to adopt 
naturalism despite the impossibility of justifying a whole research program all at once. 
 
 Rea’s most provocative claim, however, is that naturalists are not justified in 
accepting realism about material objects (e.g., pp. 8, 78), and Rea clearly regards this as 
his main (albeit only pragmatic) objection to being a naturalist.  His argument for it, 
though elaborate, can be summarized without excessive caricature (I hope) as follows: 
 
“A material substance, such as a dog, if it exists, has persistence conditions: it 
possesses certain properties—essential properties—that it cannot survive without.  And if 
a material substance is to exist mind-independently, as robust realism about material 
objects requires, then its possession of essential properties must be mind-independent too.  
Suppose now that naturalists are to be justified in holding that some material substance 
exists.  Then, since the existence of a material substance requires that it possess mind-
independent essential properties, reflective naturalists who are fully alert to their situation 
must also be justified in holding that the material substance in question possesses mind-
independent essential properties.  However, naturalists cannot justify any attribution of 
mind-independent essential properties to any material substance.  For naturalists are 
disposed to treat the methods of science and those alone as basic sources of evidence.  
These methods include only observation plus theoretical inferences from premises 
supported by observation; but observation, which is only ever of what is actually the 
case, can therefore only justify the belief that a material substance does possess, never 
that it must possess, a given property; and it is hard to see how attributions of mind-
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independent essential properties could be supported on the ground that they provide the 
best explanation of any class of observable phenomena.   But since naturalists cannot 
justify the attribution of mind-independent essential properties to any material substance, 
it follows that naturalists cannot justify their belief in the existence of any mind-
independent material substance; which is to say that naturalists, precisely because of their 
defining methodological commitments, cannot justify realism about material objects.” 
 
Rea’s imaginative reasoning here might be questioned at a couple of points.  First, 
what reason is there, beyond an appeal to intuition or common sense, for accepting Rea’s 
premiss that material substances mind-independently have persistence conditions in his 
sense?  Why can’t naturalists just deny it, saying instead that while it is fully objective 
whether a material substance of a given kind exists, whether that very substance counts as 
persisting is determined by the conventional or instinctive responses of human cognizers?  
Secondly, Rea’s argument seems to require a closure principle, something to the effect 
that if you’re justified in believing p, and in believing that p implies q, then you must be 
justified (via some independent route) in believing q; but is some closure principle that 
meets his needs true? 
 
Rather than pursue these questions, let me instead explore the scope for 
outsmarting Rea’s argument, i.e., for cheerfully accepting the apparently unacceptable 
consequence to which, he argues, naturalism leads.  This would amount to conceding that 
in fact there are no material substances, given that claiming their existence commits you 
to mind-independent essential properties.  How high a price for naturalists to pay would 
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this concession be?  Perhaps not high at all—or so I will suggest.  (For further optimism 
about the prospects for doing without substances, see John O’Leary-Hawthorne and 
Andrew Cortens, “Towards Ontological Nihilism”, Philosophical Studies, 79: 143-165, 
1995.) 
 
 On its face, admittedly, a commitment to the non-existence of material substances 
sounds extremely implausible.  And it certainly is extremely implausible if the alternative 
view envisaged is that regions of space usually thought to contain dogs or other material 
substances are just empty.  But naturalists are not committed to that alternative.  For 
disbelief in material substances can be combined with continued belief in property-
instances, i.e., instantiations of properties in regions of spacetime, or in time-slices of 
material substances (e.g., dog-stages).  Thus, for example, even if naturalists, compelled 
to disbelieve in dogs, cannot hold that any dog persists from t1 to tn, they can still hold 
that doghood is instantiated in a certain region at t1, and again at t2, and again at t3, and so 
forth, where “doghood” is so understood as to avoid commitment to persistence.   So 
naturalists can allow that a certain spacetime region usually thought to contain a dog or 
other material substance really does contain something; they merely insist that this 
something is a sequence of property instances, or of doggy time-slices, rather than a 
persisting material substance as understood by Rea. 
 
And this insistence is not obviously false.  To see this, consider how you might 
persuade naturalists that in repudiating material substances (while retaining property 
instances or time-slices) they had made an obvious mistake.  You could hardly appeal to 
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the evidence of their senses, since they could plausibly reply that their substance-free 
account of the world accounts for all the appearances: after all, the sensory appearance of 
a world with dogs might be exactly the same as that of a world without dogs but with 
appropriate sequences of doghood-instantiations or of doggy time-slices.  And you could 
hardly complain that their obvious mistake was to omit all mention of mind-independent 
essential properties, since this omission is hardly an obvious mistake and, from a 
naturalist perspective, it is no mistake at all.   
 
 But even if a naturalist repudiation of material substances involves no obvious 
mistake, does it not still entail—implausibly—that ordinary folk are in error when they 
apply material-substance concepts (or terms) to the world?  Not necessarily.  For the 
folk’s application of material-substance concepts to the world could perhaps be 
interpreted, or reinterpreted, in projectivist fashion.  That is, we could claim that the folk 
are disposed, by instinct or convention, definitely to apply a given material-substance 
concept to a region of spacetime if a sequence of property instances or of time-slices 
there meets certain conditions (e.g., if the property instances or time-slices in the 
sequence are appropriately related to one another); and also disposed definitely not to 
apply the same material-substance concept to a region of spacetime if a sequence of 
property instances or of time slices meets certain other conditions.  However, because 
there could be actual or possible sequences of property instances or of time-slices that 
meet neither set of conditions, and hence that trigger neither disposition, applications of 
material-substance concepts would have assertibility conditions but not truth conditions 
(like such utterances as “Have a nice day!”).  Of course, I give here only the crudest 
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sketch of a view, and it might be that any attempt to formulate it properly yields 
incoherence.  But if a projectivist (re)interpretation of the folk’s application of material-
substance concepts to the world can be satisfactorily developed along anything like these 
lines, then the folk need be guilty of no error in applying material-substance concepts.  
Indeed, naturalists can apply such concepts too, despite their denial of the existence of 
material substances.  (Thanks to Peter Markie, Matt McGrath, Alan Sidelle, and 
especially Michael Rea for helpful comments on earlier drafts.) 
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